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I. INTRODUCTION
The deaths of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Tamir Rice took the nation
by storm and sparked an examination of incidents involving police brutality and
1
the use of excessive force. Beyond the protests, public outrage, and media
backlash, emerging investigative reports have revealed police officers
2
disproportionately using excessive force against persons of color. However, in
the vast majority of American cities, those responsible for hiring and training the
officers behind the acts of excessive force face a disturbing lack of
3
accountability.
1. See Kimberly Kindy & Carol D. Leonnig, At Least 5 Ferguson Officers Apart from Brown Shooter have
been Named in Lawsuits, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/atleast-6-ferguson-officers-apart-from-brown-shooter-have-been-named-in-lawsuits/2014/08/30/535f7142-2c9611e4-bb9b997ae96fad33_story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing some of the
examination into patterns of excessive force).
2. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT
3 (March 4, 2015) [hereinafter DOJ INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON], available at http://www.
justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report_1.
pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing findings of the investigation into the
Ferguson Police Department’s policies and practices); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND
DIVISION OF POLICE (December 4, 2014) [hereinafter INVESTIGATION OF CDP] (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (concluding that the CPD engages in a pattern or practice of the excessive use of force
in violation of the Fourth Amendment); see also Jeff K. Lowenstein, Killed by the Cops, COLORLINES, (Nov. 4,
2007), available at http://www.colorlines.com/archives/2007/11/killed_by_the_cops.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (observing the racial disparity towards blacks in police shootings); Ryan
Gabrielson, et al., Deadly Force, in Black and White: A ProPublica Analysis of Killings by Police Shows
Outside Risk for Young Black Males (Oct. 10, 2014, 10:07 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/deadlyforce-in-black-and-white (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing the overrepresentation of the African American community among victims of police shootings).
3. See Lowenstein, supra note 2, at 2 (describing the racial disparity in police shootings).
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4

Officer Darren Wilson shot and killed Michael Brown on August 9, 2014.
The transcripts from the grand jury proceedings provide widely conflicting
5
accounts of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Brown’s death. We know for
certain there was a scuffle between Officer Wilson and Mr. Brown at the window
6
of the officer’s vehicle, after which, Mr. Brown turned and ran away. We also
know Officer Wilson repeatedly shot Mr. Brown, firing numerous times as Mr.
7
Brown fell to the ground, presumably subdued by previous shots to his body.
Unfortunately, 2014 made many realize that situations similar to Mr. Brown’s
death—an African American killed during an interaction with police—are neither
8
isolated, nor atypical, occurrences.
On July 17, 2014, Officer Daniel Pantaleo killed Eric Garner by applying a
9
chokehold. The officer accosted Mr. Garner, and subsequently killed him for
10
selling untaxed, loose cigarettes. Video evidence clearly shows five other
officers surrounding Mr. Garner as Officer Pantaleo placed him in a chokehold
11
and audio includes Mr. Garner’s pleas of, “I Can’t Breathe, I Can’t Breathe.”
Mr. Garner’s last words have become a rallying cry for protestors and advocates

4. Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings, Vol. 5 at 229, State v. Wilson (Sept. 16, 2014), available at
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/read-darren-wilsons-full-grand-jury-testimony/1472/ (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Grand Jury documents are not ordinarily released to the public.
However, given the widely conflicting reports about the circumstances surrounding Michael Brown’s death and
the controversial debate on racial relations it sparked, the prosecutor made the rare decision to release the
documents to the public. Id.
5. See, e.g., id. at 166, 226 (conflicting testimony of Mr. Brown’s location when Wilson fired shots); see
also Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings, Vol. 6 at 242–43, 255–59, State v. Wilson, (Sept. 23, 2014)
available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/read-darren-wilsons-full-grand-jurytestimony/
1472/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (providing different accounts of the events as
perceived by different witnesses).
6. See Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings, Vol. 5, supra note 4, at 224, 226 (providing an account of
the tussle and Mr. Brown running away); see also Paul Caussell, The Physical Evidence in the Michael Brown
Case Supported the Officer, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2014/11/ 28/the-physical-evidence-in-the-michael-brown-case-supported-the-officer/ (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that the scuffle indisputably happened).
7. See Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings, Vol. 5, supra note 4, at 229; see also Transcript of Grand
Jury Proceedings Vol. 6, supra note 5, at 248 (describing the shots fired at Mr. Brown).
8. Grace Ji-Sun Kim, ‘I Can’t Breathe’: Eric Garner’s Last Words Symbolize Our Predicament,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 18, 2014, 6:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/grace-jisun-kim/i-cant-breatheeric-garne_b_6341634.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (arguing that the death of
Mr. Eric Garner represents a broader issue in race relations).
9. See J. David Goodman & Michael Wilson, Officer Told Jury He Meant No Harm, N.Y TIMES (Dec. 3,
2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/officer-told-grand-jury-he-meant-no-harmto-eric-garner. html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (outlining the facts surrounding Mr.
Garner’s death).
10. Id.
11. Video, ’I Can’t Breathe’: Eric Garner Put in Chokehold by NYPD OfficerCVideo, THE GUARDIAN
(Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2014/dec/04/i-cant-breathe-eric-garner-chokeholddeath-video (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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hoping to bring an end to the unjustified use of excessive force by police
12
officers.
Officer Timothy Loehmann shot and killed Tamir Rice on November 22,
13
2014. Officers Loehmann and Frank Garmback responded to a call indicating a
person, “probably a juvenile,” was wielding a gun that was “probably fake” in
14
the gazebo area of a neighborhood playground. Officer Loehmann fired his
weapon twice within two seconds of approaching Mr. Rice, fatally injuring the
15
16
young boy. Mr. Rice was pronounced dead the next day, at the age of twelve.
These three deaths represent a deeper issue that has been bubbling beneath
17
the surface for some time now. Police departments place too many officers on
the streets without the proper training to handle foreseeable and reoccurring
18
situations. Surely, each officer can be blamed for taking the final act of
19
aggression, but plucking one bad apple will not fix a rotten tree. The problem
becomes institutional when police departments continually allow officers to use
20
excessive force against one segment of society.
No officer has faced criminal accountability in the highly publicized cases
mentioned above, resulting in further aggravation of the public's lack of trust in
21
the police's use of force against colored men. Grand juries in Ferguson,

12. See Ji-Sun Kim, supra note 8 (explaining the symbolism of Mr. Garner’s words).
13. See Complaint at 3, Rice v. City of Cleveland, 2014 WL 6844524 (Dec. 5, 2014) (No. 1:14-cv-02670SO) (detailing the facts surrounding Mr. Rice’s death).
14. Id.
15. Id.; see also Video, Tamir Rice: Police Release Video of 12-year-old’s Fatal ShootingCVideo, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2014) http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2014/nov/26/cleveland-video-tamirrice-shooting-police (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
16. Complaint, Rice v. City of Cleveland, supra note 13, at 3.
17. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 1–11 (2010) (arguing the criminal justice system
functions largely along color lines).
18. See e.g., INVESTIGATION OF CDP, supra note 2 (concluding that the CPD engages in a pattern or
practice of the excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth Amendment); see also Sari Horwitz et al.,
Justice Dept. to Probe Ferguson Police Force, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2014), available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-dept-to-probe-ferguson-police-force/2014/09/
03/737dd928-33bc-11e4-a723-fa3895a25d02_story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (describing some of the 30 recent investigations into police departments across the nation for civil
rights violations).
19. See ALEXANDER, supra note 17, at 11 (providing numerous examples of police discrimination).
20. See INVESTIGATION OF CDP, supra note 2 (outlining the CDP’s practice of the excessive use of force);
Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, Remarks at Press Conference Announcing Pattern or Practice Investigation
into Ferguson Police Department (Sept. 4, 2014) available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/ attorney-generalholder-delivers-remarks-press-conference-announcing-pattern-or-practice [hereinafter Attorney General Remarks]
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the ongoing investigation into the Ferguson
Police Department’s practices in the use of force); see also Horwitz, supra note 18 (describing civil rights
investigations of police departments across the nation).
21. Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer Is Not Indicted, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-wilson-shooting-michaelbrown-grand-jury.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Dana Ford, et al., Protests
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Missouri, and Staten Island, New York, chose not to indict the officers involved
22
in the deaths of Mr. Brown and Mr. Garner. Although the respective grand jury
decisions represent an obstacle to each family’s ability to obtain relief for their
23
tragic losses, there are other legal avenues the families may pursue.
One possible avenue involves bringing a federal civil rights action against the
municipalities responsible for hiring and training the officers who killed Mr.
24
Brown and Mr. Garner. Such a civil claim would be entirely separate from any
25
criminal proceeding. Moreover, the focus of these claims moves beyond
individual officer accountability and focuses on the municipal policymakers
26
behind acts of excessive force. The family of Tamir Rice brought this type of
27
claim against the Cleveland Division of Police. However, those who follow in
28
the Rice family’s footsteps will face a substantial barrier to their claim.
The current standard for imposing municipal liability under Title 42, Section
1983 of the United States Code, also known as “Civil Action for Deprivation of
Rights,” is quite stringent, and in most situations leaves plaintiffs without any
29
form of relief. To meet the standard, a plaintiff has the burden of proving a
municipal policy or custom exhibited a deliberate indifference to his or her
30
constitutionally protected rights. Realizing the unlikelihood of proving liability
under this standard, Mr. Garner’s family accepted a settlement offer releasing the
City of New York from liability in any civil rights claim connected with
31
Mr. Garner’s death. Because the deliberate indifference standard effectively

Erupt in Wake of Chokehold Death Decision, CNN (Dec. 8, 2014, 8:14 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2014/12/04/justice/ new-york-grand-jury-chokehold/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
22. See Davey, supra note 21, and Ford, supra note 21, for a description of the lack of indictments in
these cases.
23. See Davey, supra note 21 (indicating that the Ferguson Police Department may have engaged in
patterns of civil rights violations); see also Ford, supra note 21 (indicating there will be a civil rights
investigation).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West 2014).
25. See id. (indicating that § 1983 claims are a civil remedy for plaintiffs who have suffered violations of
their constitutionally protected rights).
26. See Lowenstein, supra note 2 (contemplating whether there is an institutional problem that leads to
the unequal use of excessive force against persons of color). In any event, the officers involved will likely be
entitled to qualified immunity as the actions may fall within the scope of their duty. See Pearson v. Callahan,
129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (indicating that protection from civil liability applies regardless of whether the
government official makes a mistake of law, mistake of fact, or both).
27. Complaint, Rice. v. City of Cleveland, supra note 13, at 5.
28. Matthew J. Cron, et al., Municipal Liability: Strategies, Critiques, and a Pathway toward Effective
Enforcement of Civil Rights, 91 DENVER UNIV. L. REV. 584, 585 (2014).
29. § 1983; Cron, supra note 28, at 585.
30. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 379, 392 (1989); see Teressa. E. Ravenell, Blame It on the
Man: Theorizing the Relationship Between § 1983 Municipal Liability and the Qualified Immunity Defense, 41
SETON HALL L. REV. 153, 161 (2011).
31. See BUREAU OF LAW & ADJUSTMENT, NEW YORK CITY OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER, ERIC
GARNER SETTLEMENT RELEASE (July 13, 2015), available at http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/family-
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32

insulates municipalities from liability under § 1983 claims, this Comment
suggests imposing municipal liability when a municipality consciously
disregards the risk of a constitutional violation to the rights of a citizen.
Part II of this Comment discusses the legal background that gave rise to the
33
deliberate indifference standard, and where it stands today. Part III argues that a
new standard is needed if § 1983 claims against municipalities are to be an
effective remedy for those who suffer civil rights violations at the hands of
34
municipal employees. Part IV addresses justifications for the current standard,
and endorses retention of qualified immunity for police officers in order to
prevent municipal liability from collapsing into respondeat superior liability
35
under § 1983 claims. Part V promotes the imposition of a conscious disregard
standard, and explains how it would afford relief to plaintiffs with colorable
36
claims while also preserving the justifications for the current standard. Part VI
37
applies both standards to the cases of Mr. Brown, Mr. Garner, and Mr. Rice.
II. THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD
This section discusses the development of the deliberate indifference
standard in the context of § 1983 cases and articulates the extreme burden the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of this standard imposes on plaintiffs in suits
against municipalities. Part A details the origins of the deliberate indifference
38
standard in § 1983 claims against municipalities. Part B discusses the
39
confirmation and qualification of the deliberate indifference standard. Part C
40
discusses the modern articulation of the deliberate indifference standard. Part D
provides definitions for “policy” and “custom,” terms that the Court consistently

eric-garner-accept-5-9m-settlement-source-article-1.2291065 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (providing details of the settlement).
32. See Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (showing that, although Monell held that
municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity and complete insulation from § 1983 claims, the Supreme
Court has failed to hold a municipality liable applying the deliberate indifference standard); see also Canton,
489 U.S. 378 (1989); Bd. Cty. Comm’rs Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); Connick v. Thompson, 131
S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (all holding the municipality was not liable under the deliberate indifference standard). See
generally Cron, et al., supra note 28 (describing the harshness of the deliberate indifference standard).
33. Infra Part II.
34. Infra Part III.
35. Infra Part IV. Respondeat superior is a legal doctrine, most commonly used in tort actions, that holds
an employer or principal legally responsible for the wrongful acts of an employee or agent if such acts occur
within the scope of the employment or agency. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1505 (10th ed. 2014).
36. Infra Part V.
37. Infra Part VI.
38. nfra Part II.A.
39. Infra Part II.B.
40. Infra Part II.C.
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41

employs when discussing the deliberate indifference standard. Part E argues that
the deliberate indifference standard provides municipalities with an unreasonable
42
level of insulation from § 1983 claims.
A. The Birth of § 1983 Claims Against Municipalities and the Deliberate
Indifference Standard
Today, anyone who has been deprived of a constitutional right by a person
43
acting under the color of state law may bring a § 1983 claim. However, § 1983
actions could not be brought against municipalities until the Supreme Court
44
decided Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York in 1978.
Although Monell held that municipalities were subject to § 1983 claims, it did
45
not provide a standard for determining municipal liability. Moreover, the Court
qualified its holding by requiring a plaintiff’s injury to be the result of a
municipal “policy” or “custom,” and further held that municipalities could not be
46
liable under the theory of respondeat superior liability.
City of Canton v. Harris established the initial standard for municipal
47
liability under § 1983 claims. The Supreme Court acknowledged that a plaintiff
may have a legal claim under § 1983 when a city’s failure to provide adequate
48
training to police officers deprives the plaintiff of a constitutional right.
However, the Court held that a city faces liability only where a particular policy
or custom of the city—in this case, the alleged failure to train—“amounts to
deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons with whom the
49
police come into contact.”
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion detailed what must be proven in order
50
for a municipality to be liable under the deliberate indifference standard. First,
the plaintiff must prove both fault and causation as to the acts or omissions of the
51
city. Second, proof of fault must be shown by events and circumstances that
establish a policy of action or inaction that is parallel to a city’s decision to
52
violate the Constitution.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Infra Part II.D.
Infra Part II.E.
U.S.C. § 1983 (West 2014). Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Id.
See id. at 695 (discussing municipal liability without providing a standard).
Id. at 694.
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 379 (1989).
Id. at 392.
Id. at 379 (emphasis added).
Id. at 394–95.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 395.
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Although the Court ultimately remanded the case for determination under the
newly announced deliberate indifference standard, the majority and concurring
53
opinions both suggested that Ms. Harris would not prevail under the standard.
54
Ms. Harris fell down several times following arrest. She was asked if she
55
required medical attention, but could not respond coherently. The officers did
56
not summon medical personnel to assist Ms. Harris. Instead, the arresting
57
officers left Ms. Harris lying on the floor of the police station for over an hour.
The Canton Police Department gave shift commanders discretion to determine
58
whether an arrestee required medical assistance. However, the shift
59
commanders were not trained to make these determinations. Ms. Harris was
thereafter released from custody and an ambulance transported her—at her own
60
cost—to the nearest hospital. She was hospitalized for one week because of
61
severe emotional ailments. The Court suggested the city was not deliberately
indifferent to Ms. Harris’ constitutionally protected rights because she would be
unable to prove existence of a policy of inaction among officers in providing
62
medical aid to arrestees.
As in Monell, the Canton Court was keen to establish a difficult standard for
imposing municipal liability because of a strong desire to insulate municipalities
63
from respondeat superior liability. To support this stance, the Court expressly
disapproved of a standard that promoted frivolous claims; the Court was wary of
a standard that allowed plaintiffs to argue there was something the city “could
64
have done” to prevent injury to plaintiff’s rights. The Canton Court provided
very little reasoning for why it imposed such a harsh standard of municipal
65
liability, and it provided no reasoning for why a lesser standard than deliberate
indifference would not meet the concern of preventing respondeat superior

53. Id. at 392–94.
54. Id. at 381.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 381.
58. Id. at 381–82.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 392–95 (indicating the record was not sufficient to impose municipal liability under the
deliberate indifference standard).
63. See id. at 378–79 (reasoning that “lesser standards of fault and causation would open municipalities to
unprecedented liability under § 1983; [it] would result in de facto respondeat superior liability, a result rejected
in Monell”).
64. See id. at 391–92 (arguing a lesser standard would encourage § 1983 plaintiffs to point to something
the city “could have done” and engage the courts in endless second-guessing of municipal training programs).
65. See id. at 391. The Court also suggests avoidance of standards that would impose municipal liability
due to municipal negligence or allow municipal liability for an employee’s negligence. Id.
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66

liability in § 1983 actions. Rather, the Court asserted that the deliberate
67
indifference standard is most consistent with the precedent of Monell.
The Canton Court established a strict standard for imposing municipal
liability, but also posed hypothetical situations that could serve as the basis for
68
municipal liability:
[I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or
employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the
inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that
the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been
deliberately indifferent to the need. It could also be that the police, in
exercising their discretion, so often violate constitutional rights that the
need for further training must have been plainly obvious to the city
policymakers, who, nevertheless, are “deliberately indifferent” to the
69
need.
These hypothetical situations are discussed after analyzing whether the
Brown, Garner, and Rice cases would be successful under the deliberate
70
indifference standard.
B. Confirmation and Qualification of the Deliberate Indifference Standard
The Court further developed the deliberate indifference standard in Board of
County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown: “A plaintiff must demonstrate
that a municipal decision reflects deliberate indifference to the risk that a
violation of a particular constitutional or statutory right will follow the
71
decision.” It would not be enough for a plaintiff to simply identify conduct that
72
was properly attributable to the municipality. Rather, the plaintiff must show
that the municipality’s deliberate conduct was the “moving force” behind
73
plaintiff’s injury. Moreover, the Court held that there must ordinarily be a
pattern or practice that leads to violations in order to find a municipality
74
deliberately indifferent to the consequences of failing to train its employees.
66. Id. at 385–400.
67. 489 U.S. at 388–89 (referencing Monell’s precedent that § 1983 municipality liability can only be
imposed where municipal policies are the “moving force [behind] the constitutional violation.”)
68. Id. at 390.
69. Id.
70. See infra Part VI (analyzing the three cases under both the deliberate indifference and conscious
disregard standard).
71. Bd. Cty. Comm’rs Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 411 (1997) (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 404.
73. Id. (emphasis in original).
74. Id. at 407; see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389–90 (1989).
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The Court recognized the limited circumstances outlined in Canton, in which a
municipality may be found liable for singular incidents––namely, the
municipality’s failure to adequately train its officers—but also emphasized that
there must be a “program necessarily intended to apply over time to multiple
75
employees” to impose liability.
In Brown, the officer who used excessive force while arresting a young
woman had a criminal history, which included resisting arrest, driving while
76
intoxicated, public drunkenness, and multiple charges of assault and battery.
The officer was also related to the sheriff in charge of screening and hiring new
77
applicants.
The Brown Court acknowledged that the sheriff’s decision to ignore the
officer’s background amounted to an indifference of the consequences of hiring
the officer, but found that the decision did not amount to a deliberate
78
indifference. Apparently, ignoring the officer’s criminal record and hiring him
onto the police force would not “lead a reasonable policymaker to conclude that
the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to hire the applicant would be
79
the deprivation of a third party’s federally protected right.”
The Court echoed the precedents of Monell and Canton, reasoning that
municipalities could not be held liable under the theory of respondeat superior,
and that the plaintiff must identify a municipal policy or custom as the cause of
80
injury. The Court expressed a desire to avoid respondeat superior multiple times
81
before announcing the holding, but, like the Canton Court, gave no reason why

75. Brown, 520 U.S. at 407. See Canton 489 U.S. at 388–90 (describing the limited circumstances of
municipal liability discussed in Part II.B of this Comment).
76. Brown, 520 U.S. at 401, 428. The full rap sheet listed repeated traffic violations, driving while
intoxicated, driving with a suspended license, resisting arrest, and more than one charge of assault and battery.
Furthermore, the officer pled guilty to assault and battery and other charges only sixteen months before being
hired by the Sheriff. Id.
77. Id. at 401. Perhaps realizing that the officer was not the best hire, the Sheriff authorized Officer Burns
to make arrests, but did not authorize the officer to carry a weapon. Id.
78. Id. at 411 (emphasis added). The consequences referred to were violations of Plaintiff’s right to be
free from the use of excessive force. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 403–04 (“Locating a policy ensures that a municipality is held liable only for those
deprivations resulting from the decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts
may fairly be said to be those of the municipality.”).
81. Id. at 406, 410, 414. “That a plaintiff has suffered a deprivation of federal rights at the hands of a
municipal employee will not alone permit an inference of municipal culpability and causation.” Id. at 406. “To
prevent municipal liability for a hiring decision from collapsing into respondeat superior liability, a court must
carefully test the link between the policymaker’s inadequate decision and the particular injury alleged.” Id. at
410. “[Section] 1983 cases involving hiring decisions present the greatest risk that a municipality will be found
liable for an injury it did not cause, therefore rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be adhered to
prevent that from happening.” Id. at 414.
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a lesser standard than deliberate indifference would not address the respondeat
82
superior liability concern.
Instead, the Court provided examples of situations that would meet this high
standard of liability, such as an intentional decision by municipal policymakers to
deprive an individual of a federally protected liberty or an action directed by the
83
municipality itself that violated federal law. Presumably, municipalities do not
affirmatively instruct officers to violate constitutionally protected liberties.
Consequently, proving these examples would be a tall, if not impossible, hurdle
for a plaintiff to overcome in order to succeed in a § 1983 action against a
84
municipality.
Brown did nothing more than muddle the definition of the deliberate
indifference standard by attempting to distinguish liability for a municipal policy
85
or custom from respondeat superior liability. This distinction is far from clear
and has made it difficult for courts to distinguish between the policymaking
authority of the municipality and the delegated discretionary authority of
86
individual municipal employees.
C. Modern Application of the Deliberate Indifference Standard
The Supreme Court most recently applied the deliberate indifference
87
standard to a § 1983 case in Connick v. Thompson. In Connick, prosecutors
failed to disclose evidence that should have been provided to the opposing
88
counsel defending Thompson against a robbery charge. As a result, Thompson
89
was convicted. Because of the conviction, Thompson did not testify in a

82. See id. at 402–16 (providing no reason why a lesser standard of municipal liability would not address
the concerns of the majority); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385–400 (1989) (making no mention of
why a lesser standard of municipal liability could not prevent respondeat superior liability).
83. Id. at 405.
84. Cron, et al., supra note 28 at 584, 604.
85. See also Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397, 400–01 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing the lower courts’
confusion in determining municipal liability). Compare Brown, 520 U.S. at 408, 435 (finding sheriff was a
policymaker) and Harris v. Pagedale, 821 F.2d 499, 508 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding that municipality was
deliberately indifferent to allegations of sexual assault), with Greensboro Prof’l Fire Fighters Ass’n. v.
Greensboro, 64 F.3d 962, 965–66 (4th Cir. 1995) (determining fire chief was not a policymaker) and Wilson v.
Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1240–41 (7th Cir. 1993) (ruling municipality was not deliberately indifferent to
allegations of abuse).
86. Brown, 520 U.S. at 434.
87. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). Although Connick did not address claims of the
excessive use of force, the affirmation of the deliberate indifference standard and the high burden the decision
imposed upon plaintiffs will be similarly applied to municipalities that fail to train or inadequately train police
officers who continually impinge upon the constitutional rights of citizens. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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subsequent jury trial for a murder charge against him. Thompson was convicted
91
of murder and spent eighteen years in prison, including thirteen on death row.
Shortly before his execution date, an investigator discovered the evidence that
92
prosecutors failed to disclose during his robbery trial. Both of Thompson’s
convictions were vacated, and this suit followed.
To succeed under the deliberate indifference standard, Thompson had to
show that the District Attorney was on notice it was so predictable prosecutors
would make evidence disclosure mistakes absent specific training that failure to
93
train the prosecutors amounted to a conscious disregard of Thompson’s rights.
The majority reasoned that failure to train the prosecutors on evidence disclosure
requirements did not amount to a deliberate indifference of Thompson’s rights
because the prosecutors received such training while obtaining their juris
94
doctorates. By this same logic, the Court distinguished the municipal
employees’ violation of Thompson’s rights from the Canton and Brown
95
hypothetical rights violation that would amount to a deliberate indifference.
The majority then reiterated that stringent fault standards must be adhered to
prevent municipal liability under § 1983 from collapsing into respondeat
96
superior. However, the Court again failed to offer any reasoning for why these
97
assertions must be taken as true. Specifically, the Court did not mention, let
alone explain, why a lesser standard than deliberate indifference would fail to
accomplish the goal of preventing municipal liability from becoming respondeat
98
superior liability. All that was provided was a bare assertion with citations to the
99
Court’s past decisions.
The dissenting opinion pointed out four specific reasons why the Court
should have found the district attorney’s office deliberately indifferent to
Thompson’s rights: (1) the district attorney, as the office’s sole policymaker, did
not understand the disclosure requirements; (2) those in the office who were
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1365.
94. Id. at 1361–66. The prior training consisted of taking Criminal Procedure in law school. One of the
four prosecutors who violated Thompson’s rights admitted he did not remember the disclosure requirements
from law school. Another prosecutor admitted that his law school did not require students to take Criminal
Procedure. Id. at 1385.
95. See id. at 1361–63 (arguing that the facts before the Court were sufficiently different than the Canton
hypothetical because the municipal employees had knowledge of the constitutional implications of their actions
via the training they received in preparation for entering into the profession).
96. Id. at 1365.
97. See id, at 1365 (providing no empirical or statistical support for why a standard any less stringent
would result in respondeat superior liability).
98. Id.
99. See id. at 1360 (citing Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986) and City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989)).
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directly responsible for training less experienced prosecutors were also
uninformed; (3) prosecutors in the office did not receive any training on
disclosure requirements; and (4) the office did not keep prosecutors up to date on
100
relevant legal developments concerning disclosure requirements. Moreover,
several other facts supported a different outcome: the district attorney admitted
that he failed to provide training even though he was aware that prosecutors
101
would regularly face evidence disclosure decisions;
there were no
102
repercussions for attorneys who violated evidence disclosures rules; and, when
the district attorney retired, more than half of the assistant attorneys in the office
103
revealed that they had not received the training needed to do their jobs.
It is only natural that such a widespread lack of understanding, enforcement,
and accountability would lead prosecutors to violate the disclosure requirements
and, in doing so, violate the constitutional right of a private citizen to receive
104
those disclosures. In spite of this evidence, the Court did not find that the
prosecutor’s need for training was “so obvious,” or that the lack of training was
“so likely” to result in constitutional violations, such that the actions amounted to
105
a deliberate indifference to the rights of the plaintiff. If the acts of the
municipality in Connick did not amount to a deliberate indifference of the
Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights, it is hard to imagine that the facts of
Mr. Brown’s, Mr. Garner’s, or young Mr. Rice’s cases will be able to survive the
106
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the standard.
D. Municipal Policy or Custom
Monell, Canton, Brown, and Connick all held, with slight variation, that the
municipality must have a policy or custom that causes the plaintiff to suffer
injury of a federally protected right in order to impose municipal liability in a §
107
1983 action. However, the Supreme Court did not define what constitutes a
100. Id. at 1378.
101. See id. at 1382, 1387 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that the district attorney admitted he was
certain that prosecutors would confront issues of evidence disclosure and that he had also been indicted for
suppressing evidence).
102. See id. (pointing out that no prosecutor was disciplined or fired for violating evidence disclosure
requirements).
103. Id. at 1380.
104. See id. (arguing it was inevitable that prosecutors would misapprehend disclosure requirements due
to the widespread lack of understanding of the requirements in the district attorney’s office).
105. Id. at 1366. See also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (noting there may be limited
circumstances in which the need for training is so obvious, or the lack of training so likely to result in
constitutional violations, that a municipality is deliberately indifferent to the consequences of failing to train or
inadequately training municipal employees).
106. Id. at 1378–80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (providing a multitude of reasons why the DA’s office was
deliberately indifferent to the rights of Thompson).
107. Id. at 1365; Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Canton, 489 U.S. at 385; Brown, 520 U.S. at 417.
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municipal policy or custom in those cases. In Bryson v. Oklahoma City, the
Tenth Circuit defined a municipal “policy” or “custom” as:
(1) a formal regulation or policy statement; (2) an informal custom
amounting to a widespread practice that, although not authorized by
written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled
as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law; (3) the decisions
of employees with final policymaking authority; (4) the ratification by
such final policymakers of the decisions—and the basis for them—of
subordinates to whom authority was delegated subject to these
policymakers’ review and approval; or (5) the failure to adequately train
or supervise employees, so long as that failure results from deliberate
109
indifference to the injuries that may be caused.
This Comment analyzes the deliberate indifference standard under the
definitions of municipal “policy” and “custom” provided in Bryson.
E. The Deliberate Indifference Standard Provides Municipalities with an
Unreasonable Level of Insulation from § 1983 Claims
The Supreme Court decisions discussed above create so many hurdles for
plaintiffs seeking to recover against a municipality that, in effect, many cases are
110
decided before they are presented to a court. As Justice Souter stated in his
dissenting Brown opinion, the Supreme Court’s skepticism of municipal liability
111
has “gone too far.”
In each case where the Supreme Court affirmed the deliberate indifference
112
standard, it expressed a desire to avoid respondeat superior liability. A
thorough examination of how respondeat superior liability would function in

108. Id.
109. Bryson v. Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). A full
analysis of what amounts to a municipal “policy” or “custom” is outside the scope of this Comment. However,
the Bryson court’s definition is comprehensive and incorporates other court’s characterizations of these terms.
Id.
110. See Bd. Cty. Comm’rs Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 416–21 (1997) (Souter, J. dissenting) (arguing
against the majority’s “policy” or “custom” requirement and the requirement that the “particular” harm must be
“plainly obvious”).
111. Id. at 423.
112. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1365 (2011) (reasoning that Monell established that
respondeat superior must be avoided); Brown, 520 U.S. at 406 (observing the Court’s precedent of avoiding
respondeat superior since Monell); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391–92 (1989) (reasoning that the
teaching of Monell was to avoid respondeat superior liability in § 1983 claims).
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§ 1983 claims is beyond the scope of this Comment. Nor does this Comment
114
suggest respondeat superior should apply in this context. However, one must
wonder whether a desire to avoid respondeat superior liability is adequate
115
justification for repeatedly refusing to impose municipal liability. If respondeat
superior is liability without fault, the deliberate indifference standard has been
interpreted, in effect, as the opposite: a standard of no liability even when fault is
116
present.
Justice Souter’s dissent accurately described the result of repeatedly adhering
117
to the deliberate indifference standard. The skepticism of respondeat superior
liability has converted the deliberate indifference standard in § 1983 actions into
a “virtually categorical impossibility,” even in cases where the facts are
118
seemingly sufficient to impose municipal liability. A desire to avoid respondeat
superior liability should not result in complete insulation of municipalities when
a municipal policy or custom has caused a substantial and cognizable injury to a
119
plaintiff. A new standard—that of “conscious disregard”—would accomplish
what many thought Monell was supposed to accomplish: namely, to make
120
municipalities subject to liability under § 1983.
III. A NEW STANDARD IS NEEDED
While supporters of the deliberate indifference standard have a legitimate
121
basis for desiring a strict standard for imposing municipal liability, municipal
122
insulation has gone too far. Currently, there is no effective deterrent to the
113. For a complete analysis and arguments in support of imposing respondeat superior liability on
municipalities see Charles A Rothfeld, Section 1983 Municipal Liability and the Doctrine of Respondeat
Superior, 6 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1979).
114. See infra Part V.B. (arguing against respondeat superior).
115. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (finding district attorney’s office was not deliberately indifferent to
rights of plaintiff); Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (holding Sheriff’s Department was not deliberately indifferent to rights
of plaintiff); Canton, 489 U.S. 378 (affirming the deliberate indifference standard and suggesting Harris did not
meet the standard); see also Cron et al., supra note 28, at 584, 608 (outlining the Court’s stance in regards to
municipal liability).
116. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (holding deliberate indifference standard was not met); Brown, 520
U.S. 397 (ruling plaintiff did not meet burdens imposed by deliberate indifference standard); Canton, 489 U.S.
378 (suggesting municipality was not deliberately indifferent to the rights of the plaintiff).
117. Brown, 520 U.S. at 423 (Souter, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 421.
119. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (expressing a desire to avoid respondeat superior liability); Brown, 520
U.S. at 397 (observing Court’s precedent to avoid respondeat superior liability); Canton, 489 U.S. 378
(reasoning that the standard of municipal liability should not mirror respondeat superior liability).
120. See Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police
Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 521–23 (1993) (explaining the approach in Monell and what the case
stood for at the time).
121. See infra Part V (discussing countervailing concerns).
122. Supra Part II.E.
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recent patterns and practices of excessive force by police departments. Instead,
the inconsistent application of the deliberate indifference standard has a net
124
deterrent effect on potential plaintiffs.
A. Deterring Excessive Force
Courts must deter municipal patterns or practices that allow for violations of
125
citizens’ constitutionally protected rights.
Department of Justice (DOJ)
investigations in Cleveland and Ferguson indicate that these municipalities have
employed policies and customs that result in repeated constitutional rights
126
violations. But these two investigations are not anomalous—the DOJ has
launched more than thirty civil rights investigations into police departments
127
across the nation. This indicates that the current standard for municipal liability
is not an effective deterrent of municipal policies or customs that promote
128
excessive use of force by police officers.
Surprisingly, there is no comprehensive accounting of how many police
129
shootings occur per year in our nation’s 17,000 police departments. Many
police departments file shooting reports during some years, but not others, and
130
many do not file police shooting reports at all. However, studies have emerged
that evidence a significant, disproportionate use of deadly force by police officers
during encounters with persons of color as compared to encounters with
131
Caucasians.
Whether a municipality fails to train employees, inadequately trains
employees, or employs practices that lead to a municipal employee violating a
123. Infra Part III.A.
124. Infra Part III.B.
125. See INVESTIGATION OF CDP, supra note 2 (concluding that the Cleveland Police Department
engages in a pattern or practice of the excessive use of force that must change); see also Horwitz, supra note 18
(describing the Justice Department’s report of the Albuquerque Police Department, which concluded there had
been repeated incidents of the use of deadly and excessive force in violation of citizens’ constitutional rights
when there was no imminent threat to them or the community); Larry Kramer & Alan O. Sykes, Municipal
Liability Under §1983: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 249 (1987) (arguing that the
current standard for municipal liability under § 1983 claims is economically inefficient).
126. See INVESTIGATION OF CDP, supra note 2 (describing Cleveland’s pattern of excessive use of force);
Attorney General Remarks, supra note 20 (detailing that Attorney General Holder called for “wholesale
changes” in the Ferguson police department); see also DOJ INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON, supra note 2
(detailing findings of the investigation into the Ferguson Police Department’s policies and practices).
127. Horwitz, supra note 18 (noting that most investigations result in lawsuits by the Justice Department
against the police department).
128. See id. (outlining the DOJ’s investigations into police departments across the nation).
129. See Lowenstein, supra note 2, and Gabrielson, supra note 2 (describing the failure of police
departments to statistically account for victims of police shootings).
130. See id. (describing the varying rates of police accounting of police shootings).
131. See id. (detailing the racial disparity among victims in the few police departments that do account for
victims of police shootings).
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citizen’s rights, deterrence is the only way to stop these unsound police
132
practices. The best form of deterrence that the Courts can provide is reducing
133
the burden of proof for imposing municipal liability. The threat of substantial
monetary damages against a municipality will create an economic incentive
among policymakers to promote better patterns of practice and better training of
134
municipal employees. When a court holds a municipality accountable for
constitutional rights violations, it forces the municipality to address unsound
policies and practices in order to prevent similar violations from occurring in the
135
future. Municipal liability makes “reform of police practices an economic, as
136
well as political imperative.”
B. Interpretation of the Deliberate Indifference Standard is Far From Uniform
and Deters Plaintiffs
The judicial interpretations of the Supreme Court decisions discussed above
are far from uniform, especially when defining municipal “policy” or
137
“custom.” Moreover, there has been no uniformity as to what conduct does or
does not amount to a deliberate indifference of private citizens’ constitutionally
138
protected rights. There have been occasions when lower courts held that a
municipality was deliberately indifferent to a constitutionally protected right of a
139
plaintiff. However, the Supreme Court has yet to find a municipality liable
140
under the deliberate indifference standard in a § 1983 action.

132. See INVESTIGATION OF CDP, supra note 2 (concluding that the CPD engages in a pattern or practice
of excessive use of force that must be changed). See also Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011)
(holding the DA’s office was not liable); Bd. Cty. Comm’rs Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (finding
no deliberate indifference on behalf of the Sheriff’s department); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)
(suggesting lower courts should not find municipal liability on remand).
133. Kramer, supra note 125.
134. Id.
135. Cron et al., supra note 28, at 607.
136. Colbert, supra note 120, at 502.
137. See also Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397, 400–401 (7th Cir. 1992) (observing confusion in courts
when determining municipal liability). Compare Brown, 520 U.S. at 408 (sheriff was a policymaker), with
Greensboro Prof’l Fire Fighters Ass’n. v. Greensboro, 64 F.3d 962, 965–966 (4th Cir. 1995) (fire chief not a
municipal policymaker).
138. See, e.g., Brown, 520 U.S. at 435 (finding no municipal liability under the deliberate indifference
standard); see also Auriemma, 957 F.2d at 400–01 (explaining that courts have not applied the standard
consistently).
139. See, e.g., Harris v. Pagedale, 821 F.2d 499, 505–08 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that municipality was
deliberately indifferent to allegations of sexual assault).
140. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (holding that the DA’s office was not deliberately
indifferent to consequences of failing to train employees); Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (finding that facts did not
satisfy deliberate indifference standard); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (suggesting that the
municipality was not deliberately indifferent to the rights of plaintiff).
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Even more concerning is that there is no way to determine the true impact of
the deliberate indifference standard. There is no way to quantify how many
potential plaintiffs are deterred from filing § 1983 claims against municipalities
141
because of the burdens imposed by the deliberate indifference standard. There
are no statistics indicating how many claims settle confidentially for a low sum
142
when a municipality’s actions are particularly egregious. The legal field would
be best served by leaving the varying interpretations and counterintuitive results
of the deliberate indifference standard in the past and providing plaintiffs with a
143
new standard for municipal liability in § 1983 claims.
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE NEED FOR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AVOIDING
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR, AND A STRINGENT STANDARD FOR IMPOSING
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY IN § 1983 ACTIONS
This Part deals with alternative approaches proposed by commentators to
144
curtail the excessive use of force by police officers. Section A explores the
145
advantages of qualified immunity and argues for its retention. Section B
identifies the advantages of a tough standard of liability and argues that
respondeat superior is not the best standard for municipal liability in § 1983
146
claims.
A. Officers Need Qualified Immunity to Serve and Protect
We must not lose sight that thousands of police officers put their lives in
147
danger every day to ensure that the rest of us are not in harm’s way. The vast
141. See Cron et al., supra note 28, at 604 (explaining that high standards of municipal liability have
resulted in a scarcity of successful claims in the federal courts); see also Brown, 520 U.S. at 421 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the deliberate indifference standard of fault is a “virtually categorical impossibility” in
many cases where the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of municipal liability).
142. See, e.g., INVESTIGATION OF CDP, supra note 2, at 15 (indicating that the Cleveland Police
Department has settled many allegations of excessive force on confidential terms and diminishing transparency
on confidential terms, thereby calling for serious review of these cases going forward).
143. See infra Part V (suggesting a conscious disregard standard).
144. See Rothfeld, supra note 113 (discussing respondeat superior’s role in municipal liability); see also
Kramer, supra note 125 (arguing that the current standard for municipal liability under § 1983 claims is
economically inefficient); see also David P. Stoelting, Qualified Immunity for Law Enforcement Officials in
Section 1983 Excessive Force Cases, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 243 (1990) (arguing that qualified immunity should
not be applied at all).
145. Infra Part IV.A.
146. Infra Part IV.B.
147. See NAT’L LAW ENFORCEMENT MEM’L FUND, LAW ENFORCEMENT FACTS: KEY DATA ABOUT THE
PROFESSION, http://www.nleomf.org/facts/enforcement/?print=t (last visited Dec. 19, 2014) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (indicating that there are more than 900,000 law enforcement officers
serving in the U.S.); see also NAT’L LAW ENFORCEMENT MEM’L FUND, OFFICER DEATHS BY YEAR,
http://www.nleomf.org/facts/officer-fatalities-data/year.html?print=t (last updated April 24, 2014) [hereinafter
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majority of police officers do their best to keep the streets safe for our mothers,
148
brothers, and children. There is no denying that effective police forces are
149
necessary for our society to functionCthe alternative would be chaos. Yet,
many take for granted the protection afforded to them by our nation’s police
150
officers and argue that officers should not be entitled to qualified immunity.
Officers cannot and should not be thinking about the risks of an impending
lawsuit when there is a genuine belief that their lives, or the lives of others, are in
151
danger. It would restrict the officers’ ability to keep the peace if the law said
152
otherwise. Society needs police officers to keep our streets safe, and to keep
153
our streets safe, police officers need the ability to use force. The problem does
not lie in the officers’ ability to use force, but rather, it lies in the lack of
accountability when officers in a particular municipality continually and
154
unreasonably use excessive force.
B. Respondeat Superior Needs to Be Avoided
Previous sections criticized the Supreme Court’s reasoning in repeatedly
155
affirming the deliberate indifference standard in § 1983 actions. To be clear,

“OFFICER DEATHS”] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that there were 2,211
police officers killed in the line of duty from 2000 to 2013); see also Press Release, FBI, FBI Releases 2013
Statistics on Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (Nov. 24, 2014), available at
http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2013-statistics-on-law-enforcement-officers-killedand-assaulted (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that 49,851 officers were
assaulted in the scope of duty in 2013).
148. See DISASTER CTR., UNITED STATES CRIME RATES 1960–2013 (2014), available at http://www.
disastercenter.com/crime/uscrime.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing a
steady decline in the total number of crimes since 2002).
149. See George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,
THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 1982), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken
windows/304465/? single_page=true (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (arguing that the
presence of a police forces in communities has a limiting effect on the evolution of crime and community
degradation).
150. See, e.g., Stoelting, supra note 144 (arguing against qualified immunity).
151. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727, at 2732, 2735–36 (1982) (describing the policy behind
Qualified Immunity); see also Kit Kinports, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered
Questions, 23 GA. L. REV. 597 (1989) (describing the policy behind qualified immunity).
152. See Harlow, 102 S. Ct. at 2732, 2735–36 (explaining the reasoning in support of qualified
immunity).
153. See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (arguing that one rationale for qualified
immunity is that officials need to be shielded from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties reasonably); see generally Harlow, 102 S. Ct. 2727.
154. See, e.g., INVESTIGATION OF CDP, supra note 2 (detailing various accounts of the Cleveland division
of police that exhibits a pattern of the excessive use of force); see also Attorney General Remarks, supra note
20 (describing the ongoing investigation into the Ferguson Police Department’s practices in the use of force).
155. See supra Part III.A. (analyzing the Court’s reliance on avoiding respondeat superior as a reason for
affirming the deliberate indifference standard).
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that criticism is not focused on the reasoning per se, but rather, on the Court’s
156
over-reliance on that reasoning. Like Monell, Canton, Brown, and Connick, this
Comment agrees that municipal liability should not collapse into respondeat
157
superior liability.
The first reason to avoid respondeat superior liability is that it is inconsistent
158
with the language of § 1983. Employing a plain reading of § 1983, liability
attaches to any person who “subjects [another], or causes [another] to be
159
subjected” to the deprivation of constitutionally protected rights. The language
indicates the drafters’ intent to impose liability only when a municipality is
160
responsible for an officer’s violation of the constitutional rights of another.
Another reason to reject municipal liability that mirrors respondeat superior
liability is the economic effect it would have on already-burdened
161
municipalities. Clever counsel would be able to craft material issues of fact in
an attempt to induce settlement with municipalities that fear the monetary
162
consequences of putting a sympathetic plaintiff in front of a jury.
Municipalities may be crippled and face bankruptcy as a result of such
163
lawsuits. Any new standard must address these concerns to be an effective and
desirable solution.

156. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (relying primarily on an argument against
respondeat superior); Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (relying on the Monell
and Canton precedent of avoiding respondeat superior); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)
(allowing no reasoning other than avoiding a standard of liability that mirrored respondeat superior liability).
157. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692–94 (1978); Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1365; Brown,
520 U.S. at 416; Canton, 489 U.S. at 391–92.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West 2014).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. Respondeat superior is not an imposition of liability due to a finding of fault. Rather, it is an imposition of
liability based on the employer-employee relationship. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). See also
Monell, 436 U.S. at 692 (arguing that the legislative intent cuts against the imposition of respondeat superior
liability in the context of § 1983 claims).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (West 2014) (emphasis added).
160. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692.
161. See Rothfeld, supra note 113, at 963 (observing that the economic pressure of municipal liability
forces the municipality to make difficult choices). But see Kramer, supra note 125 (explaining the economic
inefficiency of the deliberate indifference standard).
162. See Jim Christie, Stockton, California Files for Bankruptcy, REUTERS, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/2012/06/29/us-stockton-bankruptcy-idUSBRE85S05120120629 (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review) (observing the effect municipal liability has on municipalities). Stockton is only one
of many notable U.S. cities (others include Vallejo, California. and Detroit, Michigan) to file for municipal
bankruptcy, supporting the theory that respondeat superior liability can rack up millions of dollars in judgments
against municipalities, forcing them to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy.
163. Id.
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V. THE CONSCIOUS DISREGARD STANDARD—LESS STRINGENT THAN
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE, BUT MORE STRINGENT THAN NEGLIGENCE
164

Section A of this Part defines “conscious disregard.” Section B proposes a
165
conscious disregard standard for municipal liability. Section C details why
conscious disregard is the proper standard for municipal liability under § 1983
166
claims. Section D explains that the new standard would not be a great departure
167
from precedent. Section E argues that the conscious disregard standard
168
addresses the inherent inconsistency of Monell.
A. Definition and Other Uses—California & Nevada

169

California has applied a conscious disregard standard in cases involving bad
faith insurance, wrongful discharge of an employee, products liability, drunk
170
driving, and gross negligence. In the context of employer liability, California
allows punitive damages when “[an] employer has advance knowledge of the
unfitness of an employee, and employs [said employee] with a conscious
171
disregard of the rights or safety of others.” A plaintiff may also receive
punitive damages if the employer “authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct”
172
that led to the plaintiff’s damages. California requires that a corporation’s
officer, director, or managing agent exhibit “a conscious disregard of the rights or
173
safety of others.”
California’s requirement that an “officer, director, or managing agent of [a]
corporation” must consciously disregard the rights or safety of others in order to
impose punitive damages is analogous to the requirement that a municipal
“policy” or “custom” must cause the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional
174
rights under the deliberate indifference standard. In order to impose liability,

164. Infra Part VI.A.
165. Infra Part VI.B.
166. Infra Part VI.C.
167. Infra Part VI.D.
168. Infra Part VI.B.
169. This Comment proposes that the conscious disregard standard be used in all states, but is only using
California and Nevada as examples.
170. See Bruce C. Bennett, Punitive Damages in California under the Malice Standard: Defining
Conscious Disregard, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 1065 (1984) (examining the application of the conscious disregard
standard in these areas of the law).
171. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 2014) (emphasis and substitutions added).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Compare id., with Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) and City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378 (1989) and Bd. Cty. Comm’rs Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) and Connick v.
Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
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both standards require persons in managing positions to ignore warning signs that
an employee may engage in “wrongful acts” that lead to “harmful consequences”
175
for those persons that the employee comes in contact with.
The California legislature did not provide parameters as to what constitutes a
176
“conscious disregard.” However, California’s sister state, Nevada, codified a
177
definition of the term. Under Nevada law, a finding of conscious disregard
requires proof of two elements: (1) “knowledge of probable harmful
consequences of a wrongful act,” and (2) “willful and deliberate failure to act to
178
avoid those consequences.” Nevada’s definition of “conscious disregard”
provides a framework for crafting a new conscious disregard standard for
municipal liability under § 1983.
B. The Standard
The Court should revisit the standard for municipal liability in § 1983 actions
and provide an actual definition to prevent confusion and varying application by
179
lower courts. A standard of conscious disregard that combines the California
law for imposing punitive damages with the definition from the Nevada
180
Legislature would remedy the failings of the deliberate indifference standard.
This comment proposes the courts adopt the following standard for imposing
municipal liability in § 1983 actions:
(a) knowledge of probable harmful consequences of a wrongful
181
act; and
(b) willful or deliberate failure to avoid those consequences;

182

(c) by a municipal policymaker, or those persons acting on
183
behalf of a municipal policymaker.

175. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 2014), with Bd. Cty. Comm’rs Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (arguing that locating a policy ensures a municipality is held liable only for rights
deprivations resulting from decisions that “may fairly be said to be those of the municipality”) and Connick v.
Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (arguing that the municipal policy requirement ensures a municipality
is liable only for “actions for which the municipality is actually responsible”).
176. See Bennett, supra note 170, at 1091 (proposing a definition for the conscious disregard standard).
177. NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.001 (West 2014).
178. Id.
179. See Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397, 400–401 (7th Cir. 1992) (expanding on the confusion in
courts).
180. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 2014) and NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.001 (West 2014) (using
conscious disregard), with Bd. Cty. Comm’rs Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) and Connick v.
Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (upholding deliberate indifference).
181. STAT. § 42.001.
182. Id.
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This Comment revisits these elements when analyzing the facts of the
Brown, Garner, and Rice cases under both the deliberate indifference standard
184
and the proposed conscious disregard standard.
C. The Right Balance: A Perennial “Middle-Ground”
The analysis of Canton, Brown, and Connick indicates that the Supreme
Court’s application of the deliberate indifference standard has insulated
185
municipalities from liability under § 1983 claims. Although municipal liability
should not collapse into respondeat superior liability, the standard employed
should not completely insulate municipalities in cases where the factual record is
186
sufficient to support a finding of liability.
This standard can satisfy both sides of the debate if applied properly. The
conscious disregard standard will preserve Monell, Canton, Brown, and
Connick’s precedent of not imposing municipal liability under the theory of
187
respondeat superior. It will require a plaintiff to prove that there was a
municipal pattern or practice that led to the violation of plaintiff’s constitutional
rights, thereby ensuring a municipality is liable only for “the actions for which it
188
is actually responsible.”
Unlike the deliberate indifference standard, the conscious disregard standard
provides an effective remedy for plaintiffs who have suffered constitutional
189
violations at the hands of municipal employees. The current standard often
190
functions as an impossible barrier to relief. Although a court may consider a
particular municipal “policy” or “custom” as exhibiting an indifference to the

183. See CIV. § 3294 (deleting “officer” to prevent confusion in context of excessive force claims, and
deleting “director” and “managing agent” to remain as consistent as possible to the Supreme Court’s precedent
and to reduce unnecessary language).
184. See infra Part VI (applying both standards to the facts of these three cases).
185. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (denying municipal liability); Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (holding the
deliberate indifference standard was not met); Canton, 489 U.S. 378 (affirming the deliberate indifference
standard); see also supra Part III (analyzing the Court’s reasoning in these cases).
186. See supra Part II.E.
187. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (denying municipal liability that would
come close to respondeat superior liability; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (suggesting
respondeat superior must be avoided); Bd. Cty. Comm’rs Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (reasoning
that the Court’s precedent is to avoid respondeat superior in § 1983 claims); Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct.
1350 (2011) (arguing against respondeat superior liability in § 1983 claims).
188. See Canton, 489 U.S. 378 (promoting the “policy” or “custom” requirement of the deliberate
indifference standard); Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (upholding the “policy” or “custom” requirement); Connick, 131 S.
Ct. at 1359 (2011) (arguing the “policy” or “custom” requirement is necessary to prevent respondeat superior
liability in §1983 claims).
189. See supra Part II.E.
190. Brown, 520 U.S. 397.
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rights of a citizen, the court will generally not interpret the policy as amounting
191
to a deliberate indifference.
The conscious disregard standard addresses this problem by reducing the
192
burden of proving municipal liability in § 1983 actions. Instead of the
confusing, repetitive language of the deliberate indifference standard, the
conscious disregard standard will provide a workable definition for lower
193
courts. The language is clear and the goal is straightforward: prevent
municipalities from engaging in patterns or practices that violate the
194
constitutional rights of citizens.
D. Not a Departure from Precedent
City of Canton v. Harris established the deliberate indifference standard in
§ 1983 actions and interchangeably referred to a municipality’s “deliberate” or
“conscious” choice in failing to train or inadequately training a municipal
195
employee as a basis for municipal liability. Additionally, Board of County
Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown used the language of a “conscious
disregard for the consequences of their action” in affirming the deliberate
196
indifference standard. Finally, the most recent Supreme Court case affirming
the deliberate indifference standard in § 1983 actions, Connick v. Thompson,
used the language “conscious disregard” when analyzing whether the acts of the
district attorney’s office amounted to deliberate indifference to the rights of the
197
respondent.
For these reasons, the conscious disregard standard would not be a great
198
departure from Supreme Court precedent. Rather, it would provide muchneeded clarity to a standard that has been difficult to define and set boundaries

191. Id. at 411 (arguing that the Sheriff’s actions may have amounted to an indifference that the officer
would violate the rights of plaintiff, but not a deliberate indifference).
192. See Bennett, supra note 170, at 1092 (indicating that conscious disregard is less stringent than actual
malice and more stringent than simple negligence).
193. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 (describing municipal decisions that were “so likely” or “plainly
obvious” to result in a violation of constitutional rights” as possible bases for municipal liability); see also
Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (need for training was not “so obvious” that district attorney was deliberately
indifferent to need for such training).
194. See, e.g., INVESTIGATION OF CDP, supra note 2 (explaining DOJ’s finding that the Cleveland
Division of police exhibited a pattern or practice of the excessive use of force); DOJ INVESTIGATION OF
FERGUSON, supra note 2 (finding the Ferguson Police Department displayed a pattern or practice of excessive
force).
195. Canton, 489 U.S. at 389.
196. Bd. Cty. Comm’rs Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997) (referring to “their” as the
municipality).
197. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1365.
198. Canton, 489 U.S. 378.
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199

under. This standard will deter unsound municipal practices and enhance the
protection of individual civil liberties while ensuring municipalities are not liable
200
under a theory that mirrors respondeat superior.
E. The Conscious Disregard Standard Addresses the Inconsistency of Monell
If a municipality cannot be held liable for the sort of actions the sheriff’s
department took in Brown and the district attorney’s office took in Connick, then
201
what was the point of Monell? There was no reason to create a right for
plaintiffs to bring a civil rights claim against a municipality and then impose a
202
standard for obtaining relief that borders on the impossible. The deliberate
indifference standard precludes recovery for too many who have suffered § 1983
violations at the hands of municipal employees, and the conscious disregard
203
standard is better suited to bring relief to plaintiffs who bring these claims.
VI. HOW THE STANDARDS WOULD PLAY OUT IN THE CASES OF MICHAEL
204
BROWN, ERIC GARNER, AND TAMIR RICE
This Part will apply both the deliberate indifference standard and the
conscious disregard standard to the facts surrounding the deaths of each of these
205
young men.

199. Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397, 400–01 (7th Cir. 1992).
200. See supra Part IV.B. (arguing that many current police practices need deterring); see also Canton,
489 U.S. 378; Brown, 520 U.S. 397; Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (arguing against respondeat superior liability in
§ 1983 claims).
201. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See David J. Achtenberg, Taking History
Seriously: Municipal Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2184 (2005) (tracing the history and justifications of the Monell Doctrine).
202. See Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (holding that municipalities could be sued as “persons” under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (establishing the deliberate indifference
standard); see further Achtenberg, supra note 201 (recounting Monell’s history).
203. See supra Part II.E.
204. This Comment uses the analysis and reasoning of precedent of the Supreme Court to make an
educated guess as to how the deliberate indifference standard would function if applied to the facts of the
Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Tamir Rice cases. This is not to say that the Court will not change its position
in holding municipalities liable. There are always moments in history that result in changes to a Court’s
precedent. That being said, this Comment was written under the assumption that the Court will adhere to its
current precedent. The same applies to the analysis of each case under the newly proposed conscious disregard
standard.
205. Infra Part VII.A–D.
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A. Michael Brown
A DOJ investigation into the Ferguson Police Department (FPD) found a
pattern or practice of using excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment
206
that was specifically targeted at African American residents. At the time of
Michael Brown’s death, one former and five current members of the Ferguson
207
police force faced unrelated federal lawsuits for excessive use of force. The
police department also conducted at least six internal investigations into the
208
excessive use of force prior to Mr. Brown’s death. Despite having knowledge
of their officers’ use of excessive force, the Ferguson Police Department
repeatedly put these officers into situations where civil rights violations were
209
likely to occur.
1. Estimation Under the Deliberate Indifference Standard
The conduct of the FPD is similar to, but more egregious than, the conduct of
210
the sheriff’s department in Brown. Federal claims and internal investigations
into the FPD included allegations that a twelve-year-old boy was “hog-tied” for
checking his family’s mailbox; that officers “pistol-whipped” young children;
that officers killed a mentally ill man with a stun gun; and that officers used
211
canines to injure nonviolent offenders, including children.
In Brown, the officer who used excessive force when arresting the
212
respondent had a recent history of violent behavior. The officer’s history
should have alerted the sheriff, acting as a municipal policymaker, that the
particular officer was likely to use excessive force in violation of citizens’
213
rights. However, the Supreme Court found that the sheriff’s department was not
deliberately indifferent to the likelihood that the officer would use excessive

206. See DOJ INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON, supra note 2, at 3–5 (detailing the findings of the
investigation into the Ferguson Police Department’s policies and practices).
207. Horwitz, supra note 18.
208. See id. (detailing federal claims and internal investigations into the Ferguson Police Department).
209. Id.; see also DOJ INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON, supra note 2 (indicating that the Ferguson Police
Department employed a pattern or practice of the excessive use of force especially targeted toward African
American residents).
210. Compare Bd. Cty. Comm’rs Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 425–30 (1997) (detailing how the
Sheriff, as policymaker, hired a relative of his as an officer after ignoring his criminal record and the likelihood
of rights violations), with Horwitz, supra note 18 (describing the allegations against the Ferguson Police
Department).
211. Horwitz, supra note 18; DOJ INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON, supra note 2, at 31.
212. Brown, 520 U.S. at 428.
213. Id. at 429 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the officer’s use of excessive force against the
respondent was a “plainly obvious consequence of hiring him as a law enforcement officer authorized to
employ force in performing his duties”).
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214

force in violation of the respondent’s constitutionally protected rights. If
Michael Brown’s case is tried consistent with the Supreme Court’s precedent, a
215
similar result will follow.
2. Estimation Under the Conscious Disregard Standard
Taken together, the first and third prongs of the conscious disregard standard
require a municipal policymaker to have knowledge of the probable harmful
216
consequences of a wrongful act. In this case, the wrongful act was the
disproportionality of Ferguson officers’ use of excessive force against the
217
African American community. The probable harmful consequences were that
an officer’s excessive use of force would gravely injure an African American
218
member of the community.
The DOJ investigation into the FPD indicates knowledge among
219
policymakers of patterns of excessive force by Ferguson police officers. The
investigation indicates that FPD supervisors were aware that officers consistently
used excessive force against vulnerable groups of the community, such as the
220
mentally ill, the cognitively disabled, and juveniles.
Furthermore, the
investigation indicates that the FPD was aware that the overwhelming use of
221
excessive force was targeted at African Americans. The findings indicate
municipal policymaker knowledge of the probable harmful consequences of the
FPD’s wrongful conduct.
The second and third prongs of the conscious disregard standard require
willful failure by the municipality to avoid the probable consequences of the
222
FPD’s wrongful acts. The DOJ investigation into the FPD indicates that no
corrective measures were taken to remedy the practice of excessive use of force,
223
even though the practice was evident. Rather, the status quo continued at least
214. Id. at 415–16.
215. Again, this is assuming that the family of Mr. Brown will pursue a civil rights action against the
Ferguson Police Department.
216. See supra Part V.B. (providing the three prongs of the proposed conscious disregard standard).
217. DOJ INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON, supra note 2, at 62.
218. Id.; see also Transcript of Grand Jury Proceedings Vol. 5, supra note 4, at 229 (recounting the
factual circumstances of Michael Brown’s death in Ferguson).
219. See Attorney General Remarks, supra note 20 (describing policymaker actions and inaction as a
basis for knowledge); DOJ INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON, supra note 2 (describing patterns of excessive force
throughout the Ferguson police force); see also Horwitz, supra note 18 (describing some of the Ferguson Police
Department’s unlawful acts).
220. DOJ INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON, supra note 2, at 28.
221. See id. (indicating that ninety percent of excessive use of force incidents were aimed at African
Americans).
222. See supra Part V.B. (introducing the conscious disregard standard).
223. See DOJ INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON, supra note 2, at 38 (indicating that review of the use of
force is ineffectual because supervisors do little investigation and do not see patterns of abuse that are evident).
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224

until Officer Wilson shot and killed Mr. Brown. Instead of implementing
practices to promote public safety and effective law enforcement, many of the
225
FPD’s practices were focused on generating revenue. The investigation
indicates that officers viewed African Americans in Ferguson as “potential
offenders and sources of revenue,” rather than viewing them as members of the
226
community that officers are responsible to protect. This amounts to a willful
failure by Ferguson policymakers to avoid the probable harmful consequences of
Ferguson officers’ wrongful conduct, and should, under the newly proposed
227
standard, warrant municipal liability.
B. Eric Garner
Prior to killing Eric Garner, Officer Pantaleo was the subject of three
separate suits for civil rights violations, all by men who, like Mr. Garner, are
228
African American. Additionally, the NYPD Patrol Guide prohibited the use of
chokeholds––the maneuver that led to Mr. Garner’s death––for over twenty
229
years. Furthermore, between June 2013 and July 2014, the NYPD received
230
more than 200 complaints for the use of chokeholds. During this time, the
NYPD developed a pattern of failing to hold officers accountable for violating
231
the mandates of the chokehold ban, and, in doing so, promoted the maneuver.

224. Id.
225. Id. at 22. (outlining FPD’s practice of generating revenue through policing).
226. Id. at 2.
227. See supra Part V.B.
228. See Kevin McCoy, Choke-hold Cop Sued in Prior Misconduct Cases, USA TODAY (Dec. 4, 2014,
9:21 PM), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/04/choke-hold-cop-pantaleosued/19899461/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
229. See Roberto A. Ferdman, Why Quibbling about the Cause of Eric Garner’s Death Completely
Misses the Point, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonk
blog/wp/2014/12/03/the-nypd-banned-chokeholds-20-years-ago-but-hundreds-of-complaints-are-still-beingfiled/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing Officer Pantaleo’s history of civil rights
transgressions against African American men).
230. See id. (explaining that the NYPD failed to take action for the reported incidents of a banned
maneuver).
231. N.Y.C. CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REV. BD., AN EVALUATION OF CHOKEHOLD ALLEGATIONS AGAINST
MEMBERS OF THE NYPD FROM JANUARY 2009 THROUGH JUNE 2014 (2014), available at http://www.nyc.
gov/html/ccrb/downloads/pdf/Chokehold%20Study_20141007.pdf [hereinafter CHOKEHOLD ALLEGATIONS] (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (arguing that the department effectively endorses officers
use of the chokehold maneuver by not enforcing the ban against it).
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1. Estimation Under the Deliberate Indifference Standard
To begin with, the NYPD was aware that officers continually violated the
232
department’s chokehold ban. Although the municipality had knowledge of
233
these violations, it did not hold the officers accountable for the violations.
Moreover, the NYPD did not take any measures to prevent officers like Officer
234
Pantaleo from violating the chokehold ban in the future.
This is analogous to Connick, where the city banned the particular civil rights
violation the plaintiff suffered: the failure to comply with required evidence
235
disclosures. The failure had occurred in the past, the municipality had
knowledge that required evidence was not disclosed in the past, and no corrective
236
measures were taken to prevent the violation from occurring in the future.
However, in Connick the Court held that this conduct did not amount to a
deliberate indifference and did not impose municipal liability, albeit by a slim 5–
237
4 majority.
Perhaps the facts surrounding Mr. Garner’s death would have led to a
238
different result. Perhaps these facts are so analogous to the hypothetical
situations Justice O’Connor posited in Canton that the Court would have changed
239
its position on imposing municipal liability under § 1983 claims. However, the
Court’s precedent suggests the chances of that happening were quite improbable
and was likely a major consideration in the Garner family’s decision to accept a
240
settlement offer releasing the city from liability.
2. Estimation Under the Conscious Disregard Standard
The first and third prongs of the conscious disregard standard require
municipal policymaker knowledge of the probable harmful consequences of a

232. Id.
233. Id.; see also Ferdman, supra note 229 (pointing out the NYPD’s failure to take action after repeated
chokehold incidents).
234. Ferdman, supra note 229.
235. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
236. Id. at 1374–84.
237. Id. at 1369.
238. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
239. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (providing hypothetical scenarios that should
give rise to municipal liability); see also supra Part II.B. (providing Canton’s hypothetical situations).
240. Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350; Bd. Cty. Comm’rs Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); Canton,
489 U.S. 378; Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see J. David Goodman, Eric Garner Case Is
Settled by New York City for $5.9 Million, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/07/14/nyregion/eric-garner-case-is-settled-by-new-york-city-for-5-9-million.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (providing some of the considerations that went into the family’s decision
to accept the city’s settlement offer).
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241

wrongful act. The wrongful act here was allowing officers to repeatedly violate
242
the chokehold ban. The probable harmful consequences of repeatedly allowing
243
chokeholds were that someone would be gravely injured by the maneuver. The
two-hundred-plus complaints about chokehold usage in the year immediately
preceding Mr. Garner’s death gave the NYPD policymakers adequate knowledge
of the probable harmful consequences of allowing officers to violate the
244
chokehold ban.
The second and third prongs of the conscious disregard standard require
willful failure by the NYPD to avoid the probable consequences of its officers’
245
wrongful acts. First, the NYPD failed to enforce the chokehold ban and failed
246
to hold officers accountable for violating the chokehold ban. Second, the
NYPD failed to remove Officer Pantaleo, a repeat offender, from foot patrol
247
while he was a defendant in three pending lawsuits. These two facts indicate a
willful failure to avoid the probable consequences of allowing officers to violate
the chokehold ban. Therefore, the conscious disregard standard would provide
248
Mr. Garner’s family with relief.
C. Tamir Rice
When Officer Loehmann shot and killed Tamir Rice, Mr. Rice was playing
249
alone at a park, not pointing his toy gun anywhere or at anyone. When the
officers approached in their vehicle, Mr. Rice did not point the fake gun at the
250
officers, nor did he direct any threats toward the officers. In fact, Mr. Rice’s
possession of the toy gun was in accordance with Ohio law at all times of the
251
incident. Nevertheless, Officer Loehmann fired his weapon twice within two
252
seconds of approaching Mr. Rice. Just twelve days after Mr. Rice’s death, the
DOJ issued an investigative report finding that the Cleveland Division of Police

241. See supra Part V.B. (providing the three prongs of the proposed conscious disregard standard).
242. Ferdman, supra note 229.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See supra Part V.B. (introducing the conscious disregard standard).
246. Ferdman, supra note 229.
247. See McCoy, supra note 228 (describing the past constitutional violations by Officer Pantaleo).
248. See supra Part V.B. (providing the conscious disregard standard).
249. Complaint, supra note 13, at 3.
250. See id. (demonstrating that Tamir Rice acted in accordance with Ohio law when in possession of the
airsoft gun, and providing video surveillance footage showing that Mr. Rice did not brandish the gun at the
officers when they approached and got out of their police cruiser).
251. Id.
252. Id.
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(CDP) engaged in a pattern or practice of the use of excessive force. The
transgressions outlined include inadequate training on the use of force, and
insufficient accountability for officers who had developed a pattern of using
254
excessive force.
1. Estimation Under the Deliberate Indifference Standard
Before Mr. Rice’s death, there were other incidents of CDP officers using
lethal force on people who did not pose an immediate threat to the officers or
255
others. Furthermore, the CDP failed to implement any system of accountability
256
for the use of excessive or lethal force. The findings of the DOJ investigation
257
should provide the Court with the evidence needed to hold the CDP liable.
The fact that unsound police practices, of which supervisors were aware,
ultimately led to the death of a twelve-year-old boy may also play a role in the
258
court’s disposition of the case. On the other hand, the precedent is difficult to
259
overcome. Nonetheless, until the deliberate indifference standard is reexamined
and ultimately replaced by a slightly lower threshold for municipal liability, too
many citizens who have suffered recognizable violations of their constitutionally
260
protected rights will be left without any form of relief.
2. Estimation Under the Conscious Disregard Standard
The first and third prongs of the conscious disregard standard require a
municipal policymaker to have knowledge of the probable harmful consequences
261
of a wrongful act. The wrongful acts in this case included the CDP officers’

253. See INVESTIGATION OF CDP, supra note 2, at 4 (concluding that the CPD engages in a pattern or
practice of excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, including, but not limited to:
unnecessary and excessive use of deadly force in the form of shootings and head strikes; the excessive and
unnecessary use of tasers, chemical spray, and fisticuffs; using excessive force on the mentally ill; and tactics
that place officers in situations where avoidable force becomes inevitable).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See id. at 3 (outlining the Cleveland Division of Police’s various constitutional violations).
258. See Complaint, supra note 13, at 2 (providing Mr. Rice’s age at the time of death); see also
INVESTIGATION OF CDP, supra note 2, at 3 (indicating CDP supervisors tolerated and in some cases endorsed
unsound police practices).
259. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 379 (1989) (suggesting the municipality was not
deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s rights); Bd. Cty. Comm’rs Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 397 (1997)
(holding that the sheriff’s department was indifferent, but not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s rights);
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1358 (2011) (holding that the municipality did not display a deliberate
indifference to the constitutional violations suffered by plaintiff).
260. See supra Part II.E.
261. See supra Part V.B. (providing the three prongs of the proposed conscious disregard standard).
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262

continual use of unnecessary and unreasonable force. The probable harmful
consequences were such that a member of the community would be seriously
263
hurt by an officer’s excessive use of force. The DOJ investigation indicates that
policymakers and supervisors in the CDP tolerated the use of unnecessary and
264
unreasonable force, and, in some cases, endorsed it. Furthermore, supervisor
investigation of officers’ use of force was designed to justify the officers’
265
actions. These findings show that municipal policymakers at the CDP knew of
266
the probable harmful consequences of wrongful acts by municipal employees.
The second and third prongs of the conscious disregard standard require
willful failure by the CDP to avoid the probable consequences of CDP officers’
267
continual use of excessive force. CDP supervisors knew that officers were
using excessive force, but did not take any actions to avoid the probable
268
consequences of these officers’ actions.
The DOJ outlined the CDP
transgressions in its report as follows: failure to properly investigate the officers’
use of force, failure to “objectively investigate” allegations of misconduct, and
269
failure to respond to clear patterns of risky police behavior. Under the second
prong of the proposed conscious disregard standard, the CDP’s repeated decision
not to remedy patterns of excessive use of force amounts to a willful failure to
270
avoid the probable harmful consequences of that use of force. Therefore, the
proposed conscious disregard standard would also afford relief to the family of
271
Tamir Rice.
D. Summary and a Look to the Future
The limited circumstances for imposing municipal liability under the failure
to train theory that Canton describes foreshadow the facts and circumstances
272
surrounding the deaths of these three young men. The DOJ investigations of the
Cleveland and Ferguson police departments indicate that the officers of these
departments “so often violate constitutional rights that the need for further
262. INVESTIGATION OF CDP, supra note 2, at 3.
263. See Complaint, supra note 13, at 3 (providing the factual circumstances of Mr. Rice’s death).
264. INVESTIGATION OF CDP, supra note 2, at 4.
265. Id. at 5.
266. See id. (outlining knowledge among high ranking officials in the Division of Fourth Amendment
violations).
267. See supra Part V.B. (introducing the conscious disregard standard).
268. INVESTIGATION OF CDP, supra note 2, at 3–4.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Supra Part V.B.
272. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n. 10 (1989) (“It could also be that the police, in
exercising their discretion, so often violate constitutional rights that the need for further training must have been
plainly obvious to the city policymakers, who, nevertheless, are ’deliberately indifferent’ to the need.”).
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training must have been plainly obvious to the city policymakers.” A review of
the NYPD officers’ recent practices—specifically Officer Pantaleo’s practices in
274
Staten Island—would lead to a similar conclusion regarding the NYPD. The
hope is that the Court will alter its staunch stance on the application of the
deliberate indifference standard, but hoping is not enough.
Given the Court’s precedent––even with the strong dissents in Brown and
Connick––it is not likely to find that the municipalities were deliberately
indifferent to the likelihood that municipal employees would violate the rights of
275
private citizens. Barring a change in approach, it is unlikely that the Court will
276
step back from its deliberate insulation of municipalities in § 1983 claims.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court should adopt a conscious disregard standard to make municipal
liability under § 1983 a genuine possibility. Although Monell established a right
to bring § 1983 claims against municipalities, Canton effectively precluded that
277
right by crafting such a staunch standard for liability. Moreover, the Court’s
application of the standard in Brown and Connick can be taken as nothing short
278
of deliberate indifference to the results of the deliberate indifference standard.
A conscious disregard standard would serve as an appropriate middle ground
between the legitimate concern of citizens for the protection of their rights, and
the legitimate concern of municipalities of being exposed to respondeat superior
279
liability for the independent actions of municipal employees. The conscious
disregard standard would curtail over-protection of municipalities’ wrongful
conduct, while preserving the Supreme Court’s longstanding precedent of
avoiding a standard of municipal liability in § 1983 actions that mimics
280
respondeat superior liability.
273. See INVESTIGATION OF CDP, supra note 2, at 3 (explaining Cleveland Division of Police’s pattern of
excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Attorney General Remarks, supra note 20
(describing the ongoing investigation into the Ferguson Police Department’s practices in the use of force); see
also Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 (indicating that a municipality’s constructive notice of repeated constitutional
violations may lead to municipal liability in limited situations).
274. See CHOKEHOLD ALLEGATIONS, supra note 231 (arguing with statistical support that the department
effectively endorses officers use of the chokehold maneuver by not enforcing the ban against it). But see
McCoy, supra note 228 (describing the past events of alleged constitutional violations by Officer Pantaleo).
275. Bd. Cty. Comm’rs Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 416–38 (1997); Connick v. Thompson, 131
S. Ct. 1350, 1370–87 (2011).
276. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. 1350; Brown, 520 U.S. 397; Canton, 489 U.S. 378 (the Supreme Court has
avoided finding municipal liability in § 1983 claims).
277. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Canton, 489 U.S. 378.
278. See supra Part II.E.
279. See supra Part IV.B.
280. See supra Part II.E. (arguing municipal insulation has gone too far); see also supra Part II.A.
(discussing the Court’s stance in avoiding respondeat superior liability).

137

2015 / Accountability Matters: An Examination of Municipal Liability
Although the conscious disregard standard cannot bring back those tragically
lost due to officer’s excessive use of force, it may bring some semblance of relief
281
to the families of Michael Brown, Eric Garner, and Tamir Rice. Moreover,
unlike the current standard, the imposition of a conscious disregard standard will
act as a deterrent against unsound municipal policies and customs by serving as a
282
check on the hiring practices and training methods of municipalities.

281. See supra Part VI (applying the conscious disregard standard to the facts of each anticipated case).
282. See supra Part III.A. (arguing that the practices of many police departments across the nation must
be deterred).
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